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PROSECUTION, SCREENING AND DIVERSION

77-la-9. References

77-2-1

in other provisions.

Whenthe term peace officer, or any category of peace officer, is used in any
other provision of law, the term includes anyone authorized to exercise
authorityas provided in this chapter, except federal officers.
History:C. 1953, 77-la-9, enacted by L.
1985,ch. 174,§ 3.

CHAPTER2
PROSECUTION, SCREENING AND
DIVERSION
Section
77-2-1.
77-2-1.1.
77-2-2.
77-2-3.

Authorization to file information.
Signing and filing of information.
Definitions.
Thrmination of investigative action.
Dismissal of prosecution.
77-2-4.
77-2-4.5. Dismissal by compromise - Limitations.
Diversion agreement - Negotia77-2-5.
tion - Contents.

77-2-1. Authorization

Section
77-2-6.
77-2-7.
77-2-8.
77-2-9.

Dismissal after compliance with
diversion agreement.
Diversion not a conviction.
Violation of diversion agreement
- Hearing - Prosecution resumed.
Offenses ineligible for diversion.

to file information.

Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed charging the
commissionof any felony or class A misdemeanor unless authorized by a
prosecutingattorney.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-1, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Authorizationby prosecuting attorney.
Stepsrequired to initiate prosecution.

Authorizationby prosecuting attorney.
Oncethe information is authorized by a prosecutingattorney, its presentment and filing are
not acts which the prosecuting attorney must
personally perform. State ex rel. Cannon v.
Leary,646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982).
Althoughprosecutor's authorization and signature affixed on the reverse side of the informationviolated R.Civ.P. lO(d) requirement limitingimpressions to one side of the paper only,
violation did not deprive the trial court of

Steps required to initiate prosecution.
The steps required to properly initiate prosecution of a felony by information are: screening of the case by the prosecutor; authorization
of the prosecution, evidenced by the signature
of the prosecutor affixed to the information;
presentment of the information to a magistrate;
subscribing and swearing to the information by
the complaining witness; and filing of the information with the magistrate or clerk of the
court. State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 P.2d
727 (Utah 1982).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R. - Limitations on state prosecuting
attorney's discretion to initiate prosecution by
indictment or by information, 44 A.L.R.4th 401.

77-2-1.1.

Signing and filing of information.

The prosecuting attorney shall sign all informations. The prosecu
attorney may:
(1) sign the information in the presence of a magistrate; or
(2) present and file the information in the office of the clerk where
prosecution is commenced upon the signature of the prosecuting attome
History: C. 1953, 77-2-1.1, enacted by t.
1992, ch. 33, § 2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 33 be-

77-2-2.

came effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Definitions.

For the purpose of this chapter:
(1) "Screening'' means the process used by a prosecuting attorney
terminate investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismi
a prosecution that has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to
diverted;
(2) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to con·
tion on the condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabi •
tation program or make restitution to the victim or fulfill some oth
condition; and
(3) "Commencement of prosecution" means the filing of an informati
or an indictment.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-2-3.

Termination of investigative

action.

Prior to the commencement of prosecution, the prosecutor may, withou
approval of a magistrate, authorize a termination of investigative action wh
it appears that further investigative action is not in the public interest.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-2-4.

Dismissal of prosecution.

After commencement of a prosecution the prosecutor may, upon reasonab
grounds, move the magistrate before whom the prosecution is pending
dismiss the prosecution. If, in the judgment of the magistrate, the prosecuti
should not continue, he may dismiss the prosecution and enter an order •
dismissal stating the reasons for the dismissal in the order.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-2-4.5. Dismissal by compromise - Limitations.
(1) In misdemeanor cases the court may dismiss the case upon motion of the
prosecutorifit is compromised by the defendant and the injured party, except
under Subsection (2). The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromisebefore the court or in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth
and entered in the minutes. The order is a bar to another prosecution for the
sameoffense.
(2) A dismissal by compromise may not be granted when the misdemeanor
is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the performance of his duties,
or riotously, or with intent to commit a felony.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-4-5, enacted by L.
1990,ch. 7, § 3.

77-2-5. Diversion agreement - Negotiation

- Contents.

(1) At any time after the filing of an information or indictment and prior to
conviction,the prosecuting attorney may, by written agreement with the
defendant, filed with the court, and upon approval of the court, divert a
defendantto a non-criminal diversion program.
(2) A defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for
diversionand at the time of execution of any diversion agreement unless he
shallhave knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court
hearing relating to a diversion program.
(4) Any diversion agreement entered into between the prosecution and the
defenseand approved by a magistrate shall contain a full, detailed statement
ofthe requirements agreed to by the defendant and the reasons for diversion.
Adecisionby a prosecuting attorney not to divert a defendant is not subject to
judicialreview.
(5) Diversion programs longer than two years shall not be permitted.
(6) A diversion agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant,
beforea magistrate and in the agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-5, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Citedin State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah

1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R.- Pretrial diversion: statute or court
rule authorizing suspension or dismissal of

criminal prosecution on defendant's consent to
noncriminal alternative, 4 A.L.R.4th 147.
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Dismissal after compliance
ment.

with diversion agree-

The court shall dismiss the information or indictment filed against the
defendant who has complied with the requirements of his diversion agreement
and the defendant shall not thereafter be subject to further prosecution for the·
offense involved or for any lesser included offense.
History: C. 1953, 77•2·6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-2-7.

Diversion not a conviction.

Diversion is not a conviction and if the case is dismissed the matter shall be.
treated as if the charge had never been filed.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-2-8.

Violation of diversion agreement
Prosecution resumed.

-

Hearing -

If, during the course of the diversion of a defendant, information is brought
to the attention of a magistrate or the prosecuting attorney that the defendant·
has violated his diversion agreement and it appears in the best interests ofthe·
community to reinstate and proceed with the prosecution, the prosecuting
attorney, upon court approval, or the magistrate, on his own motion, shall1
cause to be served upon the defendant an order to show cause specifying
facts relied upon by the prosecuting attorney or magistrate to terminate
diversion and shall set a time and place for a hearing to determine whether or
not the defendant has violated his diversion agreement. If, at the hearing, the
magistrate finds the defendant has failed to comply with any terms ot
conditions of the diversion agreement, he may authorize the prosecuting
attorney to proceed with prosecution. The prosecution of a diverted offense
shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from any offense that
constituted a violation of any term or condition of the diversion agreement by
which the original prosecution was diverted.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-2-9.

Offenses ineligible for diversion.

Diversion may not be granted by a magistrate for a capital felony or a felony
in the first degree or in any case involving a sexual offense against a victim,
who is under the age of 14 or for any motor vehicle related offense invol •
alcohol or drugs.
History: C. 1953, 77-2-9, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15,§ 2;1983,ch.88,§
34;1983,ch.
101, § 1.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah
1989).

CHAPTER2a
PLEAS IN ABEYANCE
Section
77-2a-1.
77-2a-2.

77-2a-3.

Definitions.
Plea in abeyance agreement Negotiation Contents Terms of agreement - Waiver
of time for sentencing.
Manner of entry of plea - Powers
of court.

Section
77-2a-4.

Violation of plea in abeyance
agreement - Hearing - Entry
of judgment and imposition of
sentence - Subsequent prosecutions.

77-2a-1. Definitions.
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction
against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply
with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into
between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms
and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the
court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
ffistory: C. 1953, 77-2a-l, enacted by L.
1993,ch. 82, § 3.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement - Negotiation
Contents - Terms of agreement - Waiver of
time for sentencing.
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to
entry ofjudgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon
motion of both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in
abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor
imposesentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained in Rule
22(a),Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a
plea in abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any
plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court
hearing relating to a plea in abeyance agreement.
(4) (a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant and approved by the court shall include a full,
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detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions agreed to by the
defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in
abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and·
felonies, the agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance.
by the court, be executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and'
the defendant's counsel in the presence of the court.
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months
if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the.
plea was to any degree of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and
felonies.
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the court, and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently:
waives time for sentencing as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-2, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 82, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

77-2a-3.

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Manner of entry of plea - Powers of court.

(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement.
shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the
agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the
case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms ofa'
plea in abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offens8i
dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as·
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense
pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section·
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were Olli
probation to the court under Section 77-18-1.
r,
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and,
pursuant to the terms of the agreement:
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee,:
which shall be allocated in the same manner as ifit had been paid as a fine:
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which could have been.
i
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense;
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of admini~!
tration of the agreement;
•
(c) order the defendant to pay full restitution to the victims of hls.i
actions as provided in Section 76-3-201;
•1
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program'
required by the terms of the agreement; and
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(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could
have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the
prosecutingattorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney
notto agree to a plea in abeyance is not subject to judicial review.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense
against a victim who is under the age of 14.
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-3, enacted by L.
1993,ch. 82, § 5.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement - Hear-

ing - Entry of judgment and imposition
tence - Subsequent prosecutions.

of sen-

(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement,
informationcomes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the
requestof the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit,
orupon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear
beforethe court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court
shouldnot find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the
agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the
courtfinds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the
defendantfor the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the
defendantas a plea in abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall
be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any
independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation
ofany term or condition of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed
in abeyance.
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-4, enacted by L.
1993,ch. 82, § 6.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER3
SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE
Section
77-3-1.
77-3-2.
77-3-3.

Threatened offense - Complaint.
Examination of complainant and
witnesses.
"Complaint" defined.

Section
77-3-4.
77-3-5.
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Warrant of arrest - Temporary
restraining order.
Defendant taken before different
magistrate - Procedure.

77-3-1
Section
77-3-6.
77-3-7.
77-3-8.
77-3-9.

77-3-1.
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Change of venue.
Hearing - Evidence - Record.
Findings and orders - Discharge
- Undertaking - Commitment.
Filing undertaking with county
clerk.

Section
77-3-10.
77-3-11.
77-3-12.

Assault in presence of magistratA
or court.
Undertaking, when broken Prosecution.
Record of conviction conclusiv,:
evidence - Judgment on under,
taking.
•

Threatened offense - Complaint.

A complaint that a person has threatened to commit an offense against t}w
person or property of another may be made before any magistrate.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. - Duty of sheriff to preserve peace,§ 17-22-2(1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
before him as a prerequisite to the issuanceof
the warrant. Areson v. Pincock, 62 Utah 527;
220 P. 503 (1923).

ANALYSIS

Elements.
-Fear.
Right to require peace bond.
Elements.
-Fear.
Element of fear was not required to be specifically stated in the complaint, but was to be
concluded by the magistrate from the facts laid

Right to require peace bond.
Person who attempts unlawfully to enter on
land in lawful possession of another cannot
require latter to give peace bond because he
resists and threatens to shoot if unlawful at-·
tempt is persisted in. Johnston v. Meaghr, 14
Utah 426, 47 P. 861 (1897).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 12 Am. Jur. 2d Breach of
Peace and Disorderly Conduct §§ 41 to 51.
C.J.S. -11 C.J.S. Breach of the Peace§§ 17
to 26.

77-3-2. Examination

Key Numbers. - Breach of the Peace ®:a 15
•
to 22.

of complainant

and witnesses.

The magistrate shall examine, on oath, the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and may take their testimony in writing.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-3.

"Complaint" defined.

A complaint, within the meaning of this chapter, is a statement in writing
setting forth the jurisdictional facts, specifying the threatened offense, and
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant before the magistrate.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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77-3-8

77-3-4. Warrant of arrest - Temporary restraining order.
Ifthe magistrate believes there is reasonable ground to fear the commission
ofthe offense threatened, he may:
(1) Issue a warrant directed generally to any peace officer, reciting the
substance of the complaint and commanding the officer to immediately
arrest the person complained of and bring him before the magistrate or in
the case of his absence or inability to act before the nearest and most
accessible magistrate of the county; and
(2) Issue a temporary restraining order against the commission of the
offenseand order the person complained of to immediately appear before
the magistrate for a hearing.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-4, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Arrest, by whom and

how made,§ 77-7-1 et seq.
Warrants generally, Rule 6, U.R.Cr.P.

77-3-5. Defendant taken before different
Procedure.

magistrate

When the person arrested is taken before a magistrate other than the one
whoissued the warrant, the peace officer who executed the warrant shall
deliverit to the issuing magistrate with his endorsed return. The complaint
andwritten testimony, if any, on which the warrant was issued shall be sent to
the magistrate before whom the person arrested is taken.
History: C. 1~53, 77-3-5, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-6. Change of venue.
Whenthe person complained ofis brought before the magistrate, a change of
venuemay be had for good cause shown.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-6, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-7. Hearing-Evidence

- Record.

At the time set for hearing, the magistrate shall take evidence. The hearing
may be recorded or reduced to writing.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-7, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-8. Findings and orders -Discharge
- Commitment.

- Undertaking

(1) Ifit appears there is no reasonable ground to fear the commission of the
offense alleged to have been threatened, the person complained of shall be
discharged. The complainant may be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings if the magistrate believes the complaint was unfounded and frivolous.
509
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(2) If there is reasonable ground to fear the commission of an offense,
court may, in addition or as an alternative to other relief, enter an ord
permanently restraining the person from engaging in illegal conduct or ac •
in any manner that could result in illegal conduct or the person complained •
may be required to enter into an undertaking in a sum not to exceed $3,00 •
with one or more sufficient sureties, to keep the peace toward the people oft •
state and particularly toward the persons endangered. The conditions of
undertaking shall be in writing and shall be for a period of six months. It ma
be extended on good cause shown for a longer period or enlarged and a new
undertaking may be required.
(a) If the undertaking is given, the party complained of shall be
discharged.
(b) If the undertaking is not given, the magistrate shall commit the
defendant to jail specifying in the warrant of commitment the requirement
to give security, the amount thereof, and the effective period of time. ••
(c) A person committed for not giving the required undertaking may be
discharged by any magistrate when he provides the undertaking.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-8, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Malicious prosecution.
Action for malicious prosecution may grow
out of charges made under this chapter when

77-3-9. Filing undertaking

the other requisites for the bringing of sucha
suit are present. Johnston v. Meaghr, 14 Utali
426, 47 P. 861 (1897).

with county clerk.

An undertaking shall be filed, by the magistrate, in the office of the county
clerk.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-9, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-10. Assault in presence of magistrate or court.
A person who, in the presence of the court or magistrate, assaults or
threatens to assault another or to commit an offense against person or •
property, or who contends with another with threatening words, may be
ordered by the court or magistrate to give security and if he refuses to do so;
may be committed as provided in Subsection 77-3-8(2)(b).
History: C. 1953, 77-3-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-11. Undertaking,

Cross-References. -Arrest
§ 77-7-4.

by magistrate,

when broken - Prosecution.

(1) The undertaking is broken if the person posting the bond violates the
conditions set by the court.
(2) If the undertaking is broken and the county attorney produces evidence
of the violation to the district court where the undertaking was filed, the court.
shall order an action on the undertaking to be commenced, and the county
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attorney shall commence an action in the name of the state against the
principal sureties on the undertaking.
mstory: C. 1953, 77-3-11, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-3-12. Record of conviction
conclusive
Judgment on undertaking.

evidence

-

In an action filed by the county attorney to recover on an undertaking:
(1) The offense shall be alleged as a breach of the undertaking stated in
a record of conviction and a record of conviction is conclusive evidence
thereof.
(2) If the court finds the offense constitutes a breach of the undertaking,
judgment for the amount of the undertaking shall be entered against the
parties liable.
History: C. 1953, 77-3-12, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

CHAPTER4
SUPPRESSION OF RESISTANCE TO
SERVICE OF PROCESS
Section
77-4-1. Force by officer - Arrest.

77-4-1. Force by officer -Arrest.
A public officer authorized to execute process issued by any court may use
such force as is reasonable and necessary to execute service of process. If
necessary, he may seize, arrest, and confine persons resisting or aiding and
abetting resistance to his service of process.
Cross-References.
- Interference with
public servant, misdemeanor, § 76-8-301.

History: C. 1953, 77-4-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

CHAPTER5
IMPEACHMENTS
Section
77-5-1.
77-5-2.
77-5-3.
77-5-4.
77-5-5.
77-5-6.

Officers liable to impeachment.
Chief justice to preside, when.
Two-thirds vote of House required.
Trial by Senate.
Hearing, notice of - Defendant
served with articles.
Suspension on filing articles Vacancy, how filled.

Section
77-5-7.
77-5-8.
77-5-9.
77-5-10.
77-5-11.
77-5-12.
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Senators to be sworn - Twothirds required for proceedings.
Two-thirds vote necessary for conviction.
Nature of judgment.
Effect of judgment.
Impeachment not a bar to prosecution.
Rules of procedure.
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Officers liable to impeachment.

The governor and other state and judicial officers, except justices of the
peace, shall be liable to impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors o
malfeasance in office.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Abuse of office, § 768-201 et seq.

Constitutional
impeachment
Utah Const., Art. VI, §§ 17 to 20.
Removal by judicial proceedings, § 77-6-1et.
seq.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Utah Ombudsman:
The American Proposals, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 32.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public
Officers and Employees §§ 211 to 218.
C.J.S. - 67 C.J.S. Officers §§ 179 to 181;

81A C.J.S. States§ 98.
I
A.L.R. - Misconduct during previous term,'
impeachment of public officer for, 42 A.L.R.3d'
691.

77-5-2. Chief justice to preside, when.
When the governor is on trial, the chief justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, and, in case he is disqualified or unable to act, the Senate shall select
some other justice of the Supreme Court to preside.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-3. Two-thirds vote of House required.
The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment, but
in order to impeach, two-thirds of all the members elected shall vote therefor.·
Impeachments shall be by resolution. The resolution shall originate in and be
adopted by the House of Representatives.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-4. Trial by Senate.
All impeachments shall be tried by the Senate sitting for that purpose.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-5. Hearing, notice of ticles.

Defendant

served with ar•

The Senate shall assign a day for the hearing of the impeachment and
inform the House of Representatives. The president of the Senate shall cause
a copy of the articles of impeachment, with a notice to appear and answer the
same at the time and place appointed, to be served on the officer being
impeached not less than ten days before the day fixed for the hearing.
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History: C. 1953, 77-5-5, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-6. Suspension
filled.

on filing articles

-

Vacancy, how

Whenarticles of impeachment are presented to the Senate, and the officer
has been served with a copy of the articles, he shall be temporarily suspended
fromhis officeand may not exercise his duties until he is acquitted. Upon the
suspensionof any officer, other than the governor, or a justice or judge of a
courtofrecord, his office shall be temporarily filled by an appointment made by
the governor, with the consent of the Senate, until the acquittal of the party
impeached,or, in the case of his removal, until the vacancy is filled at the next
electionas provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-6, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2; 1986, ch. 47, § 36.

77-5-7. Senators to be sworn - Two-thirds required for
proceedings.
At the time and place appointed, and before the Senate proceeds to act on the
impeachment, the secretary shall administer to the president of the Senate,
andthe president of the Senate shall administer to each of the members of the
Senatethen present, an oath or affirmation to do justice according to law and
the evidence and no member of the Senate shall act or vote on the impeachment,or any question arising on it without taking the oath or affirmation and
being present during the proceedings. No proceedings shall be conducted
unless at least two-thirds of the senators elected and entitled to vote are
present.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-7, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-8. Two-thirds vote necessary for conviction.
The officer shall not be convicted on impeachment without the concurrence
oftwo-thirds of the senators elected, voting by ayes and nays, and if two-thirds
ofthe senators elected do not concur in a conviction, he shall be acquitted.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-8, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-9. Nature of judgment.
The judgment may be that the officer be suspended, or removed from office
and disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit in the state.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-9, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
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77-5-10.

Effect of judgment.

If judgment of suspension is given, the officer, during the continuance
thereof, is disqualified from receiving the salary, fees, or emoluments of the
office.
History: C. 1958, 77-5-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-11. Impeachment

not a bar to prosecution.

The officer, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law for any offense committed
that constituted a basis for the impeachment proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 77-5-11, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-5-12.

Rules of procedure.

The procedure for impeachment proceedings shall be adopted by rule in each
house and such rules shall govern.
History: C. 1958, 77-5-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

CHAPTER6
REMOVAL BY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
Section

77-6-1.
77-6-2.
77-6-3.
77-6-4.
77-6-5.

Officers subject to removal.
Commencement of action for removal.
Form of accusation.
Presentation of accusation - Service
on defendant.
Appearance - Procedure on default.

77-6-1.

Section
77-6-6.

77-6-7.
77-6-8.
77-6-9.

Answer - Objections for insuffi•
ciency.
Trial on denial or refusal to answer
- Procedure.
Judgment of removal - Service on
defendant.
Appeal - Suspension from office.

Officers subject to removal.

All justices of the peace and all officers of any city, county or other political
subdivision of this state not liable to impeachment shall be subject to removal
as provided in this chapter for high crimes and misdemeanors or malfeasance
in office.
History: C. 1958, 77-6-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Abuse of office, § 768-201 et seq.
City manager, removal by council, § 10-31225.

Constitutional authority, Utah Const., Art.
VI,§ 21.
Impeachment, § 77-5-1 et seq.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
knowledge on part of claimant of the wrong he
was perpetrating, or at least under such circumstances that any reasonable person who
had done the same thing would have known
that he was doing something wrong; the innocent filing of an illegal claim, thinking one is
entitled to it, does not make malfeasance in
office in that regard. Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah
437, 55 P.2d 377 (1936).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Evidence.
Groundsfor removal.
-Excessive claim.
-Illegal claim.
-Illegal fees.
-Specific cases.
Highcrime.
Powerof removal.
State officers.
Timeof offense.

Constitutionality.
The phrase "malfeasance in office" is sufficiently definite to enable people of ordinary
intelligenceand understanding to know what
conductis required or prohibited and is not so
vague and uncertain as to make this section
invalid.State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359
P.2d12 (1961).
Evidence.
Evidence was sufficient to support a finding
that a mayor was guilty of malfeasance based
on his role in the killing of dogs for animal
control purposes, which killing led to a nolo
contendere plea by the mayor of the misdemeanorcharge of cruelty to animals. Madsen v.
Brown,701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).
Groundsfor removal.
Although, in order to constitute malfeasance
in office, it is not necessary that officer had
specificintent to defraud, it is necessary that
act charged against him involve conscious
wrongdoingon his part. Law v. Smith, 34 Utah
394,98 P. 300 (1908).
In order to authorize removal from office of
sheriff who presented for allowance and payment false claim against county for expense in
performingcertain duties after claim had been
allowedby state, it was necessary to show his
wrongfulintent. Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98
P. 300 (1908).
-Excessive claim.
Although county commissioner made excessive claim for expenses to board of county
commissioners, he could not be removed from
officebecause of presenting false or fraudulent
claimunder former § 76-28-7, making it felony
to present such claim, since presenting merely
excessive claim without intent to defraud
would not constitute felony or a~ount to rµalfeasance in office. Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596,
206 P. 711 (1922), commented on in Atwood v.
Cox,88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377 (1936).
-Illegal claim.
Illegal claim must have been put in with

- Illegal fees.
Sheriff's claim to county for money paid out
and expended by him in discharge of official
duty, for which law provided neither fees nor
compensation other than salary provided for
him by§ 17-16-14, did not present charge for
illegal fees. Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 P.
300 (1908).
It was not a collection of illegal fees for
county attorney to charge more for stenographic work than he paid his stenographer,
statute covering only fees in excess of those
fixed by law for certain services. Parker v.
Morgan, 48 Utah 405, 160 P. 764 (1916).
A charge and collection for services by an
officer from a political unit was not the collection of a fee. Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55
P.2d 377 (1936).
A false claim for materials furnished to a
political unit could not be brought because not a
"fee." By the same token, a false charge for
services rendered to the county could not be a
fee. Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377
(1936).
-Specific cases.
County commissioner who had dealt in property acquired by county under tax titles for his
private gain was subject to removal from office.
Engle v. District Court, 96 Utah 245, 85 P.2d
627 (1938).
County auditor's failure to file federal income
tax return was not an offense which was sufficient for removal of official from office. State v.
Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965).
High crime.
The term "high crime" refers to an act directed against other persons, such as robbery,
burglary, larceny, or embezzlement, or an act
which is so offensive to accepted standards of
honesty" and integrity that one guilty of such a
crime is not fit for a public trust. State v. Jones,
17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965).
Power of removal.
In absence of statute, the power of removal
was incident to power of appointment, at least
where term or tenure of officer was not fixed by
law. Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of
Comm'rs, 71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783 (1928).
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State officers.
State superintendent of public instruction
and State Board of Education are not "officers
of any city, county or other political subdivision
of this state" and are therefore not subject to
the provisions of this section. Estes v. Talbot,

597 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1979).

Time of offense.
The offense has to occur while the person
serving in the office from which it is sought
remove him. State v. Bowen, 620 P.2d 72 (U
1980).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public
Officers and Employees§§ 272 to 287.
C.J.S. - 67 C.J.S. Officers§§ 175 to 178.
A.L.R. - Misconduct during previous term,
removal of public officer for, 42 A.L.R.3d 691.
Judges, power of court to remove or suspend,
53 A.L.R.3d 882.
Validity and construction of statute authorizing grand jury to submit report concerning
public servant's noncriminal misconduct, 63
A.L.R.3d 586.
Sexual misconduct or irregularity as amount-

77-6-2.

Commencement

ing to "conduct unbecoming an officer,"jus •
ing officer's demotion or removal or suspe •
from duty, 9 A.L.R.4th 614.
Refusal to submit to polygraph examina ' •
as ground for discharge or suspension ofpu
employees or officers, 15 A.L.R.4th 1207.
What constitutes conviction within statuto
or constitutional provision making conviction
crime ground of disqualification for, remov
from, or vacancy in, public office, 10 A.L.R.5
139.
•
Key Numbers. - Officers <P 74.

of action for removal.

An action for the removal of a justice court judge or officer of a city, coun
or other political subdivision of this state shall be commenced by presenting.
sworn, written accusation to the district court. The accusation may be initia
by any taxpayer, grand jury, county attorney, or district attorney for the coun
in which the officer was elected or appointed, or by the attorney general.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-2, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§ 2;1990,ch.59,§ 27;1993,ch.
38, § 87.

Amendment Notes. - The 1993 am
ment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or
trict attorney" in the last sentence.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability.
-Appointed officers.
Nature of proceedings.
Remedies of officer.
- Writ of prohibition.

Applica}>ility.
Officer who was paid fixed and stipulated
salary, and in no way was charged with collection of fees, could be proceeded against. Skeen
v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487 (1906).
-Appointed officers.
In absence of statute, no notice or charges or
hearings were required to remove an appointed
officer whose term was not fixed by law. Sheriff
of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comm'rs, 71
Utah 593, 268 P. 783 (1928).
Nature of proceedings.
Although proceeding is of civil rather than
criminal nature, the same rules governing in-

troduction of evidence in criminal case mustbe
followed, and guilt of defendant must be es .
lished by same degree of positive proof as •
required in criminal prosecution general '
Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487 (1906).,
Proceeding to remove public official from '.
flee was of civil, and not criminal, nature, an
hence was not within former Utah Const.Art.
VIII, § 18, which provided that "style of
proc~ss shall be 'The State of Utah,' and all
prosecutions shall be conducted in the n
and by the authority of the same." Skeen
Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 P. 487 (1906); Skeen'1
Paine, 32 Utah 295, 90 P. 440 (1907); Burkev,
Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711 (1922), and
cited in opinion.

Remedies of officer.
-Writ of prohibition.
Writ of prohibition would issue to preven
district court from entertaining proceedingsfor•
removal of officer where petition for remov ,
did not charge officer with having committed·
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offense legally justifying court in removing
him,appeal not being adequate remedy in the
case.Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711
(1929);also see Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55
P.2d 377 (1936), discussing prohibition and

77-6-4

pointing out tendency of courts to issue writ to
forestall mischief even though technically there
is no lack or excess of jurisdiction in lower
court.

77-6-3. Form of accusation.
The accusation shall state the grounds for removal in ordinary and concise
language.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-3, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Sufficiency of accusation or complaint.
Accusation against county commissioner
against whom removal proceedings had been
instituted was required to state in ordinary and
conciselanguage the particular acts or things
doneby accused which constituted offense he
was charged with having committed. Burke v.
Knox,59 Utah 596, 206 P. 711 (1922).
If a complaint stated a good ground for the
removal of an officer, but either it failed to
namea section under which the proceeding was
intendedto be brought or specified a section but
the facts were insufficient to show that the
accuser could proceed under that section, yet

77-6-4. Presentation
dant.

did state grounds which made procedure under
another section applicable, the accusation
should have been held good. Atwood v. Cox, 88
Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377 (1936), removing the
inconsistency between Law v. Smith, 34 Utah
394, 98 P. 300 (1909), and Parker v. Morgan, 48
Utah 405, 160 P. 764 (1916).
An accusation and complaint against a member of board of education for allegedly presenting an illegal claim, which stated that "defendant did knowingly, willfully and corruptly
collect and receive," etc., was sufficient. Atwood
v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377 (1936).

of accusation

-

Service on defen-

When the accusation is initiated by (1) a grand jury, it shall be presented to
the court by the foreman in the presence of the grand jurors and shall be filed
with the clerk; or (2) a taxpayer, the county attorney, district attorney, or the
attorney general, it shall be presented to the presiding judge of the district
court for filing with the clerk. Except when initiated by the county attorney or
district attorney, the court shall cause a copy of the accusation to be furnished
to the county attorney or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney
who shall prosecute the accusation and cause a copy of it to be served on the
defendant, together with a summons which requires him to appear before the
district court of the county in which he serves and answer the accusation. The
time fixed for appearance shall not be less than ten days from the date of
service of summons. The service of the accusation and summons, and the
return of service shall be made in the manner provided by law for service of
civil process.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-4, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15,§ 2; 1993,ch.38, § 88.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "district
attorney" in the first sentence, inserted "or
district attorney," and "or, if within a prosecu-

tion district, the district attorney" in the second
sentence, and made stylistic changes in the
first sentence.
Cross-References. - Process, U.R.C.P.,
Rule 4.
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77-6-5. Appearance - Procedure on default.
The defendant shall appear at the time appointed and answer the accusa
tion, unless for some sufficient cause the court assigns another time for
purpose. If he does not appear, the court may proceed to hear and determ·
the accusation in his absence.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-6-6. Answer - Objections for insufficiency.
The defendant may orally answer the accusation either by admitting
denying it in open court, or he may, in writing, object to the legal sufficiencyo(
the accusation. If the objection to the sufficiency of the accusation is sustaine~
the accusation shall be dismissed. If the objection is overruled, the defendant'
'
shall immediately admit or deny the accusation.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Defenses.
In proceeding to remove defendant from office of city councilman, it was no defense that
defendant repaid money after court had decided that receipt thereof was illegal. Skeen v.
Paine, 32 Utah 295, 90 P. 440 (1907).
Defendant's resignation from office of city

councilman, after fees had been declared illegal
and defendant made restitution to city, am!;
immediate reappointment to fill vacan~
caused by his own resignation was not defensa
to removal proceeding. Skeen v. Paine, 32 Utah
295, 90 P. 440 (1907).
•

77-6-7. Trial on denial or refusal to answer-

Procedure,

If the defendant denies the accusation or refuses to answer or appear, the
court shall proceed to try the accusation. The rights of the parties ana
procedures used shall be the same as in any civil proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
.J

Right of defendant to take depositions.
Unanimous verdict not required.

counsel had procured substantially all discov•.
erable information, the order did not result in
any prejudice to the defendant. State v. Geurts,'
11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961).

Right of defendant to take depositions.
In an action to remove a city commissioner
for malfeasance in office, the refusal of the
court to permit the defendant to take depositions of witnesses was error since, under usual
circumstances, the taking of depositions should
be permitted; however, because defendant's

Unanimous verdict not required.
Since the rules of civil procedure apply to'.
trials for the removal of public officers, a unanimous verdict, such as is required in criminal
trials, is not required in order to remove a
public official. Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086.
(Utah 1985).

ANALYSIS
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77-6-9

77-6-8. Judgment of removal - Service on defendant.
If the defendant admits the accusation or is convicted, the court shall enter
judgment against him directing the defendant be removed from office and
setting forth the causes of removal. The judgment of removal shall immediatelybe served upon the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-8, enacted
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

by L.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Conviction.
Interpretation of term "convicted" to mean a
detennination by the court that the accusations
constitutingthe basis for removal were true, as

opposed to the alternative basis for judgment of
removal, the defendant's admission, would reconcile this section with § 77-6-7. Madsen v.
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

77-6-9. Appeal - Suspension

from office.

From a judgment of removal an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court
in the same manner as from a judgment in a civil action; but from entry of
judgment and until the judgment is reversed, the defendant shall be suspendedfrom his office. Pending the appeal, the office shall be filled as in the
case of a vacancy.
History: C. 1953, 77-6-9, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Writof prohibition.
If accusation against county attorney
chargedacts not legally prohibited, and, therefore,court had no jurisdiction, officer's remedy
by appeal was inadequate because he could be
removedfrom office upon accusation having no
foundationin law; accordingly, Supreme Court
couldissue writ of prohibition to prevent removal.Parker v. Morgan, 48 Utah 405, 160 P.
764(1916).
Where a city commissioner was found guilty

of malfeasance in office by a jury verdict and
petitioned for an extraordinary writ to prohibit
the district court from entering judgment because the effect thereof would be to remove him
from office pending an appeal, the Supreme
Court held that the writ of prohibition should
not be granted since to do so would result in
circumventing the intended purpose of this
section. Geurts v. District Court, 10 Utah 2d
319, 352 P.2d 778 (1960).

CHAPTER7
ARREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
Section
77-7-1.

77-7-2.
77-7-3.
77-7-4.
77-7-5.

"Arrest" defined - Restraint allowed.
By peace officers.
By private persons.
Magistrate may orally order arrest.
Issuance of warrant - Time and

Section

77-7-5.5.
77-7-6.
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place arrests may be made Contents of warrant - Responsibility for transporting prisoners - Court clerk to dispense
restitution for transportation.
Repealed.
Manner of making arrest.

77-7-1
Section
77-7-7.
77-7-8.
77-7-9.
77-7-10.
77-7-11.
77-7-12.
77-7-13.

77-7-14.

77-7-15.
77-7-16.
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Force in making arrest.
Doors and windows may be broken, when.
Weapons may be taken from prisoner.
Telegraph or telephone authorization of execution of arrest warrant.
Possession of warrant by arresting officer not required.
Detaining persons suspected of
shoplifting or library theft Persons authorized.
Arrest without warrant by peace
officer - Reasonable grounds,
what constitutes - Exemption
from civil or criminal liability.
Person causing detention or arrest
of person suspected of shoplifting or library theft - Civil and
criminal immunity.
Authority of peace officer to stop
and question
suspect
Grounds.
Authority of peace officer to frisk

Section
77-7-17.
77-7-18.
77-7-19.

77-7-20.
77-7-21.

77-7-22.
77-7-23.

suspect for dangerous wea
-Grounds.
Authority of peace officer to
possession of weapons.
Citation on misdemeanor or
fraction charge.
Appearance required by citati
-Arrest for failure to appear
Transfer of cases - Motorv
hicle violations - Disposition
fines and costs.
Service of citation on defendant
Filing in court - Contents
citations.
Proceeding on citation - Volun
tary forfeiture of bail - P
signature required - Informa
tion, when required.
Failure to appear as misdemeanor.
Delivery of prisoner a
without warrant to ma •
- Transfer to court with
diction - Violation as
meanor.

77-7-1. "Arrest" defined - Restraint allowed.
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission tP..
custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is
necessary for his arrest and detention.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Legislators privileged
from arrest, exceptions, Utah Const., Art. VI,

§ 8.
National Guard members privileged from arrest at certain times, exceptions, § 39-1-54.
State guard, exemption from arrest while on

,
duty, exceptions, § 39-4-12.
Unlawful detention a misdemeanor, § 76-5:
304.
l
Voters privileged from arrest. on electiondayt
exceptions, Utah Const., Art. Iv, § 3.
Witnesses obeying summons not subject t.o
arrest, § 77-21-5.
'

NOTES TO DECISIONS

What constitutes "arrest."
An arrest could not be made without the
presence of an intention on the part of the
arresting officer to make the arrest; notice of
arrest should have been given, either expressly
or by implication, and without such notice no

amount of physical restraint could constitut.e
an arrest. State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360,10,
P.2d 1073 (1932).
An arrest must have been made in the man•
ner authorized by law. Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah
90, 138 P.2d 246 (1943).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Comment, Arrest
Record Expungement - A Function of the
Criminal Court, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 381.
Note: Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City
Police Practices, 9 Utah L. Rev. 593.

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 et
seq.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 1 et seq.
Key Numbers. -Arrest ,s:,, 1 et seq.
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77-7-2

77-7-2. By peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
withoutwarrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch.
161,§ 1.
Cross-References. - Children, grounds for
takinginto custody, § 78-3a-29.
City police officers' arrest powers, §§ 10-3914,10-3-915,10-3-919.
Conservation officers' authority, §§ 23-20-1,
23-20-1.5.
Forcewhich peace officer may use in making
arrest,§§ 76-2-404, 77-7-7.
Highwaypatrol, arrest power, § 53-8-106.

Livestock brand inspectors' powers, § 4-2428.
Motor Carrier Act, arrests to enforce, §§ 546-44, 54-6-45.
Sheriff's power to arrest, §§ 17-22-2(1)(b).
Special police, arrest power on specified property, §§ 67-12-4, 67-12-13.
Traffic rules and regulations, arrest for violation, § 41-6-169.
Weights and measures, arrest powers of department,§ 4-9-7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arrestwithout warrant.
-Hot pursuit.
-Misdemeanor.
- Parole violation.
Authorityto sign complaint.
Falseimprisonment.
Instructions.
Noreasonable cause.
Publicoffense.
Reasonablecause.
Seizureof goods in making arrest.
Cited.
Arrestwithout warrant.
Police officers were authorized to make a
warrantless arrest of defendant for violation of
parole occasioned by association with known
felonsand attempted flight to avoid arrest after
the officers had been notified by a reliable
informant of the location of a house trailer
containingan escaped prison convict and other
parolees,defendant was identified as a parolee
by an officer at the scene and was observed to

make several trips into the trailer, and when
the officers ordered the occupants of the trailer
to surrender, the defendant came out, sounded
the horn on his automobile in an attempt to
alert the other occupants of the trailer, and
attempted to drive away. State v. Kent, 665 P.2d
1317 (Utah 1983).
Officers had probable cause to arrest based
on controlled buys of narcotics which had been
conducted prior to the search. State v. Banks,
720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).
An arrest may be made without a warrant if
from the facts known to the officer, and the
inferences which fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in the
officer's position would be justified in believing
that the suspect had committed the offense.
State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), cert. granted, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
-Hot pursuit.
Warrantless entry into defendant's home in
order to effect his arrest was justified, where
the arresting officer entered the home in hot
pursuit of defendant after chasing him from the
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scene of a disturbance. State v. Ramirez, 814
P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

-Misdemeanor.
Officer could not legally make arrest without
warrant for "good cause" in misdemeanor cases
unless offense was committed or attempted in
his presence, and arrest was made immediately
or within reasonable time thereafter. Oleson v.
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
Plea of guilty to misdemeanor did not legalize
unlawful arrest without warrant nor bar action
against arresting officer for false imprisonment, if offense was not committed in officer's
presence or arrest was not made immediately
or within reasonable time. Oleson v. Pincock, 68
Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
-Parole violation.
When a parole officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a parolee is violating parole,
no warrant is necessary to make an arrest.
State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
Authority to sign complaint.
District judge improperly dismissed complaint signed by officer other than arresting
officer since this section deals only with making
arrest and not with filing of complaints and is
not, therefore, authority for proposition that
only arresting officer has authority to sign
complaint. Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah
2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967).
False imprisonment.
If a sheriff in making an arrest was not able
to justify the arrest under some provision of
this section, it was false and unlawful, and he
was liable in a civil action for false imprisonment. Johnson v. Leigh, 74 Utah 286,279 P. 501
(1929).
A peace officer would not necessarily be held
liable for mistaking the identity of the person
named in a warrant of arrest if he had exercised reasonable diligence and care in ascertaining the identity before he served the warrant. Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400,375 P.2d
458 (1962).
Instructions.
In prosecution for homicide committed in
resisting arrest, court should have charged jury
in specific terms under what state of particular
facts, when found, an arrest is lawful or otherwise, where facts were in dispute. State v.
Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915).
No reasonable cause.
Although a defendant was speeding, an officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for burglary after the speeding stop when
at the time the officer stopped the defendant,
the only fact known to the officer that even
remotely tied the defendant to the burglaries

was the presence of the vehicle he was driving.
near where one of the crimes occurred. StateY.
Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(decided under former § 41-1-17, authorizing
arrest for violation of motor vehicle Jaws).

Public offense.
"Public offense" is a broader term, covering
misdemeanors generally when attempted or
committed in officers' presence. Oleson v.
Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23 (1926).
Reasonable cause.
Sheriff's knowledge that a burglary had been
committed, that stolen property had been found
in defendant's car, and that defendant's car met
description of vehicle involved in burglary was
sufficient to sustain trial court's finding that
sheriff had reasonable cause for arresting defendant. State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451
P.2d 772 (1969).
Officer had good cause for arrest without
warrant where defendant owned automobileof
same description as one used in robbery and
particles of lead in the side of the automobile
could have been the result of shots fired at t~
robber's automobile. State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah
2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972).
Arrest and search and seizure were justifiable where officer observed defendants in automobile at late hour next to building, questioned
them as to the reasons for their presence, and
then, having allowed them to proceed, subsequently found that building had been broken
into and, after stopping defendants again,
found stolen articles in plain view in their
automobile. State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129,
499 P.2d 276 (1972).
Police officers who had know ledge that felony
had been committed and who received a tip
that both the contraband and the defendants
were located in an apartment were justified in
arresting the defendant when he was found in
the apartment, and contraband from the robbery was viewed in plain sight by the police
officers after they were voluntarily admitted to '
the apartment. State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73,
513 P.2d 435 (1973).
Arrest of defendant was lawful where officer,
responding to report of a burglary, followed
defendant's automobile after being informed by
witnesses of model of automobile and direction
in which it had gone, and arrested defendant
after stopping automobile and after witnesses
had identified him. State v. Lybert, 520 P.2d214
(Utah 1974).
Officer who stopped vehicle containing man
who fit general description of robbery suspect
had reasonable cause to search vehicle and
arrest passenger and evidence taken from car
was properly admitted as evidence at robbery
prosecution. State v. Dixon, 531 P.2d 1301
(Utah 1975).
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dant and his confederate in crime. People v.
Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94 (1896).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest§§ 34 to
36.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 12 to 15.
A.L.R. - Private person's authority, in making arrest for felony, to shoot or kill alleged

77-7-4.

felon, 32 A.L.R.3d 1078.
Liability of private citizen, calling on police
for assistance after disturbance or trespass, for
false arrest by officer, 98 A.L.R.3d 542.

Magistrate may orally order arrest.

A magistrate may orally require a peace officer to arrest anyone committing
or attempting to commit a public offense in the presence of the magistrate, and,
in the case of an emergency, when probable cause exists, a magistrate may
orally authorize a peace officer to arrest a person for a public offense, and
thereafter, as soon as practical, an information shall be filed against the person
arrested.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-7-5.

Cross-References. -Assault
magistrate, § 77-3-10.

in presence of

Issuance of warrant -Time and place arrests may
be made - Contents of warrant - Responsibil•
ity for transporting prisoners - Court clerk to
dispense restitution for transportation.

(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the
offense charged is:
(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of the
day or night; or
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night only
if:
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the
warrant;
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public highway, in a public
place, or in a place open to or accessible to the public; or
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in
the regular course of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal
offense unrelated to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest.
(2) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must appear in court,
the magistrate shall include in the arrest warrant the name of the law
enforcement agency in the county or municipality with jurisdiction over
the offense charged.
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the magistrate under
Subsection (a) is responsible for providing inter-county transportation
of the defendant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforcement
agency to the court site.
•(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the warrant may
contract with another law enforcement agency to have a defendant
transported.
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(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the magistrate under
Subsection (a) as responsible for transporting the defendant shall
provide to the court clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried,
an affidavit stating that the defendant was transported, indicating
the law enforcement agency responsible for the transportation, and
stating the number of miles the defendant was transported.
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution paid under Section
76-3-201 for governmental transportation expenses and dispense
restitution monies collected by the court to the law enforcement
agency responsible for the transportation of a convicted defendant.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-5, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§ 2;1987,ch.103,§
1;1993,ch.
17, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993, inserted the subsection designation (1), redesignated Subsections (1), (2), (2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(c) as
Subsections (l)(a), (l)(b), (l)(b)(i), (l)(b)(ii), and

(l)(b)(iii), added Subsection (2), and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. - Fee of constable executing arrest warrant, § 21-3-3.5.
Rules of evidence inapplicable to proceedings
for issuance of warrant for arrest, Rule 1101,
U.R.E.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 79.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest§ 51.

77-7-5.5. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1991, ch. 268, § 49 repeals
§ 77-7-5.5, as enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 152,

§ 16, relating to fee for warrant service, effective January 1, 1992.

77-7-6. Manner of making arrest.
The person making the arrest shall inform the person being arrested of his
intention, cause and authority to arrest him. Such notice shall not be required
when:
(1) There is reason to believe the notice will endanger the life or safety
of the officer or another person or will likely enable the party being
arrested to escape;
(2) The person being arrested is actually engaged in the commission of,
or an attempt to commit, an offense; or
(3) The person being arrested is pursued immediately after the commission of an offense or an escape.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-6, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Cross-References. - Dogs used in law en-

forcement, immunity from liability for injury
by, § 18-1-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
.ANALYSIS

Failure to give notice.
Notice not required.
Response of person arrested.
Cited.

Failure to give notice .
In a false imprisonment action, a plain
clothes security officer who accosted a customer
was not justified on the basis of privilege to
make an arrest for assault or suspected shoplifting where no timely explanation was given.
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McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah
1984).

Notice not required.
Private persons were not required to give
notice of their intention to arrest defendant and
his confederate in crime, where latter, when
first seen, were engaged in commission of criminal act. People v. Coughlin, 13 Utah 58, 44 P. 94
(1896).

Response of person arrested.
Notice of arrest in compliance with this section by an arresting officer was not an improper
custodial interrogation requiring suppression
of defendant's response. State v. Wilson, 701
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985).
Cited in State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d.-5Am. Jur. 2dArrest§§ 69to
72.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest§§ 45, 47, 48.
A.L.R. - Necessity that Miranda warnings

77-7-7.

include express reference to right to have attorney present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R.
Fed. 123.

Force in making arrest.

If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed
of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable
force to effect the arrest. Deadly force may be used only as provided in Section
76-2-404.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-7, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.
- Writ of restitution.
Section applied to a constable serving a writ

of restitution for premises. Marks v. Sullivan, 9
Utah 12, 33 P. 224 (1893).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest§§ 80 to
85.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest§ 49.
A.L.R.- Excessive force used in accomplishing lawful arrest, right to resist, 77 A.L.R.3d
281.
Deadly force in attempting to arrest fleeing
felon, right of peace officer to use, 83 A.L.R.3d
174.

77-7-8.

Peace officer's liability for death or personal
injuries caused by intentional force in arresting
misdemeanant, 83 A.L.R.3d 238.
Burden of proof in civil action for using
unreasonable force in making arrest as to reasonableness of force used, 82 A.L.R.4th 598.

Doors and windows may be broken, when.

To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases,
a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for believing
him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and
explain the purpose for which admission is desired. Demand and explanation
need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or
where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed.
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History: C. 1953, 77-7-8, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Use of force against officer.
Officerscould break open doors of building at
night when they had reasonable grounds to
believea felony was being committed therein,
and assault with deadly weapon upon officer

was not justifiable, even though he did not first
demand admittance and explain his purpose.
State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 P. 1104
(1917).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest§§ 54 to 56.

Am.Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest§§ 86 to
93.

77-7-9. Weapons may be taken from prisoner.
Any person making an arrest may seize from the person arrested all
weapons which he may have on or about his person.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-9, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References. - Property taken from
arrested person, receipt for, § 77-24-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Section did not infringe the due process

clause, Utah Const., Art. I, § 7. Riggins v.
District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 73.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 71.

77-7-10. Telegraph or telephone
tion of arrest warrant.

authorization

of execu-

Any magistrate may, by an endorsement on a warrant of arrest, authorize by
telegraph, telephone or other reasonable means, its execution. A copy of the
warrant or notice of its issuance and terms may be sent to one or more peace
officers.The copy or notice communicated authorizes the officer to proceed in
the same manner under it as if he had an original warrant.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-10, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Transmission of
Cross-References.

77-7-11. Possession
required.

agreements, instruments, and notices by telegraph or telephone, §§ 69-1-1 to 69-1-4.
Transmission of process, Rule 4(1), U.R.C.P.

of warrant by arresting

officer not

Any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding warrant of arrest
may arrest a person he reasonably believes to be the person described in the
warrant, without the peace officer having physical possession of the warrant.
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History: C. 1953, 77-7-11, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Validity of arrest made in reliance
upon uncorrected or outdated warrant list or
similar police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550.

77-7-12.

Detaining persons suspected of shoplifting
library theft - Persons authorized.

or

(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who
has reasonable grounds to believe that goods held or displayed for sale by the
merchant have been taken by a person with intent to steal may, for the purpose
of investigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a recovery of the
goods, detain the person in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of
time.
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may detain a person for the
purposes and under the limits of Subsection ( 1) if there are reasonable grounds
to believe the person violated Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-12, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15,§ 2; 1987,ch.245,§
8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

False arrest.
Probable cause.
False arrest.
Jury determination that there was no probable cause for security officer to detain shoplifting suspect rendered both the officer and the
department store liable for damages for common-law actions of false arrest and false imprisonment; but the store was not vicariously
liable for violations offederal civil rights law by
its security officer. Draeger v. Grand Cent. Inc.,
504 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1974).

suspected shoplifter, since sister did not protest
her innocence when she and shoplifter were
confronted with evidence in store. Davis v.
Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 29 Utah 2d 336,
509 P.2d 362 (1973).
Jury finding that the evidence would justifya
man of ordinary care and prudence in a strong
suspicion that the crime of shoplifting was
being committed was sufficient to support a
verdict denying damages for false arrest of
plaintiff who had been acquitted of the crimeof
shoplifting. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting GoodsCo.,
538 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1975).

Probable cause.
Store had probable cause to detain sister of

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 649.
A.L.R. - False imprisonment act, construe-

tion and effect in, of statute providing for detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d
998.
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77-7-18. Arrest without warrant by peace officer - Reasonable grounds, what constitutes - Exemption
from civil or criminal liability.
(1) A peace officer may arrest, without warrant, any person he has reasonableground to believe has committed a theft under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8,
Library Theft, or of goods held or displayed for sale.
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under Part 8, Library Theft, by
an employee of a library, or by a merchant, merchant's employee, servant, or
agent constitutes a reasonable ground for arrest, and the police officer is
relieved from any civil or criminal liability.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-13, enacted by L.
1980,ch. 15, § 2; 1987, ch. 245, § 9.
Cross-References. - Civil liability of shoplifter to merchant, §§ 78-11-14 to 78-11-16,
78-11-19.

Retail theft, detention of suspected violator
by merchant, merchant's defense to action by
suspect, §§ 76-6-603, 76-6-604.
Search and detention of suspected shoplifter,
§§ 78-11-17, 78-11-18.

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest §§ 23,
26.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 16 et seq.
A.L.R. - Construction and effect, in false
imprisonment action, of statute providing for
detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d
998.

Changing the price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
What conduct amounts to an overt act or acts
done toward commission of larceny so as to
sustain charge of attempt to commit larceny, 76
A.L.R.3d 842.

77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of person
suspected of shoplifting or library theft - Civil
and criminal immunity.
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who
causes the detention of a person as provided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes
the arrest of a person for theft of goods held or displayed for sale, is not
criminally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable cause to
believe the person detained or arrested committed a theft of goods held or
displayed for sale.
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who causes a detention or arrest
of a person under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, is not criminally
or civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the
person committed a theft of library materials.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-14, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1987, ch. 245, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Burden of proof.
Evidenceof prior conviction.
Liability.
-Acquittal.
Motivefor arrest.

Probable cause.
-Specific cases.
-Standard.
Burden of proof.
Merchant relying on this section to justify
detention or arrest of a suspected shoplifter has
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burden to show reasonable and probable cause
for believing items offered for sale had been
unlawfully taken by the detained or arrested
person; this section in essence codifies the preexisting common law defense of probable cause
to effect an arrest and expands it to incorporate
specific private persons in the shoplifting context. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

Evidence of prior conviction.
Where customer sued merchant for malicious
prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment arising from alleged shoplifting incident
and introduced evidence the incident left her
severely depressed and suicidal, merchant
which wished to introduce evidence of a prior
shoplifting conviction and its surrounding facts
as affecting the issue of damages was properly
restricted to showing fact of the prior act and
the identity of the party involved in view of,
·inter alia, the similarity of the incidents and
substantial likelihood of confusing the jury.
Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d
314 (Utah 1979).
Liability.
-Acquittal.
Store that had probable cause to detain suspected shoplifter's sister was not liable for false
arrest even though sister was subsequently
acquitted of shoplifting charge. Davis v. Zions
Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 29 Utah 2d 336, 509
P.2d 362 (1973).
Motive for arrest.
Section offered no civil immunity to a merchant who initiated a customer's arrest for
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collect
money owed, even if the money was lawfully

owed; thus section did not shield auto dealer
from liability for false imprisonment where
customer drove away in new truck after leaving
check for less than purchase price dealer was
demanding and dealer called police and asked
that truck be picked up, saying there had been
a theft. Greenwell v. Canyon Lincoln Mercury,
Inc., 575 P.2d 688 (Utah 1978).

Probable cause.
-Specific cases.
There was sufficient evidence upon which to
base a jury verdict denying damages for false
arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old
motorcycle rider, had placed a small article of
merchandise in his helmet, justifying a reasonable suspicion that he was shoplifting. Fuller v.
Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 (Utah
1975).
-Standard.
The standard applicable to detentions and
arrests by merchants is composed of both subjective and objective elements; the merchant
must allege and prove not only that he believed
in good faith that his conduct was lawful, but
also that his belief was reasonable; even if the
crime was not in fact being committed or attempted, if the merchant in good faith believes
that such facts are present as to lead him to an
honest conclusion that a crime is being committed by the person to be arrested then he may
not be held liable for false arrest. In determining the reasonableness of the conclusion, the
test to be applied is one that is practical under
the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable
and prudent man in his position would be
justified in believing facts which would warrant
making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Imprisonment §§ 44 et seq., 66.
C.J.S. - 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment
§§ 14, 21 to 25, 40(4) to (7).
A.L.R. - Defamation: actionability of accusation or imputation of shoplifting, 29 A.L.R.3d
961.
Admissibility of defendant's rules or instructions for dealing with shoplifters in action for
false imprisonment or malicious prosecution,
31 A.L.R.3d 705.

77-7-15.

Construction and effect in false imprisonment action of statute providing for detention
of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998.
Changing the price tags by patron in selfservice store as criminal offense, 60 A.L.R.3d
1293.
Key Numbers. - False Imprisonment e:, 2,
10, 13, 15.

Authority of peace officer to stop and question
suspect - Grounds.

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing
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oris attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).

ANALYSIS

Alcoholuse by minor.
Avoidingroadblock.
Basis of suspicion.
Court's findings.
Drug use.
No reasonable suspicion.
Out-of-state licenses.
Prostitution.
Revokedlicense.
Standard.
Suspected shoplifting.
Vehicles.
Cited.

Court's findings.
Trial court erred in ruling that a city police
officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify
seizing defendant, who was seen emerging from
a 24-hour grocery store at 3:30 a.m., where the
court made only a conclusory finding that defendant's answers to questions regarding the
ownership of a vehicle in the store parking lot
were "inconsistent, vague and suspicious."
State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

Alcohol use by minor.
Defendant's young appearance and the smell
of alcohol on defendant's breath gave police
officera reasonable articulable suspicion, based
on objective evidence, that the defendant had
consumed alcohol and was a minor. State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Avoiding roadblock.
Avoiding a roadblock, even assuming its legality, without more, does not create an
articulable suspicion that the occupants have
engaged in or are about to engage in criminal
activity. The act merely demonstrates a desire
to avoid police confrontation, and at best only
givesrise to a hunch that criminal activity may
be afoot. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Basis of suspicion.
The reasonable, articulable susp1c1on contemplated in this section must be based on
objective facts suggesting that the individual
may be involved in criminal activity. State v.
Menke, 787 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In order to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion to justify stopping defendant, an
officermust be able to articulate some unlawful
or suspicious behavior connecting the detainee
to the suspected criminal activity. State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When a reliable source with reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts reports the
commission of a crime and, based on the relayed facts, the dispatcher communicates the
information to the police, and the responding
officer's own observations corroborate the dispatch, reasonable suspicion exists for a stop.

Drug use.
When an officer saw defendant smoking a
cigarette, which from her training and experience she recognized as a marijuana ''joint,"
while the defendant was in a vacant parking lot
in his vehicle with the windows rolled up on a
warm day, even though the defendant's activity
was conceivably consistent with innocent activity, it was strongly indicative of criminal activity and the officer had reasonable grounds to
stop the vehicle and investigate further. Provo
City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
No reasonable suspicion.
Where suspects were detained on the basis of
a description by a fellow officer who had seen
them walking in the vicinity of a burglary, and
where the suspects were not observed at the
scene of the crime, or engaging in unlawful or
suspicious activity, the "reasonable suspicion"
test was not met. State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d
718 (Utah 1985).
Detention of defendant on a city street at
3:30 a.m. was unreasonable where the initial
decision to stop was based merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in
the area, and defendant's "nervous" conduct
was consistent with innocent as well as with
criminal behavior. State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Seizure of defendant's automobile was invalid, where his initial stop for driving in the
left lane had been used as a pretext to support
the arresting officer's "hunch" that defendant
was engaged in illegal activity. State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
No reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
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The defendant's brief visit to a house under
surveillance because of a suspicion of drug
trafficking was not a sufficient basis for an
officer to stop the defendant's vehicle after her
departure from the house. The facts were not
sufficient to give the officer an articulable suspicion that the defendant had engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

Out-of-state licenses.
An officer had no reasonable susp1c1on to
make an investigatory stop based merely on the
fact that a car with out-of-state license plates
was moving slowly through a neighborhood late
at night. State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah
1986).
Prostitution.
Police officers who observed a woman standing on a sidewalk talking to the male occupant
of a pickup truck, and who believed that a
prostitution deal had been made, were authorized to investigate more fully by interviewing
the occupants of the vehicle. State v. Holmes,
774 P.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1989).
Revoked license.
Police officers had reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle, where they knew that defendant's driver's license had been revoked and that his
passenger was sought on an arrest warrant.

State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987).

Standard.
In traffic violation stops, in balancing the
rights of individuals to be free from arbitrary
interference by law enforcement officers and
the government's interest in crime prevention
and public protection, if a hypothetical reasonable police officer would not have stopped the
driver for the cited traffic offense, and the
surrounding circumstances indicate the stop is
a pretext, the stop is unconstitutional. State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Suspected shoplifting.
Defendant's pre-arrest seizure was valid,
where he was seen by police officers near a
shopping mall entrance removing a box from
beneath his shirt, and his actions in transferring the box's contents into a bag strongly
suggested shoplifting. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d
537 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Vehicles.
Evidence sufficient to conclude that the occupants of a vehicle may have been engaged in
criminal activity. State v. Baumgaertel, 762
P.2d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Cited in Bountiful City v. Maestas, 788 P.2d
1062 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Davis, 821
P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Leonard,
825 P.2d 664 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. -The Police Dog: Possibilities for Abuse in Finding Probable Cause

for Arrest, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 408.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 38 to 42.

77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for
dangerous weapon - Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may
frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any
other person is in danger.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-16, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
(1968). State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah
1986).

Interpretation of section.
Reasonable belief test.

Interpretation of section.
This section must be interpreted to meet the
constitutional requirements of Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889

Reasonable belief test.
In assessing the reasonableness of the officer's actions, it is not essential that the officer
actually be in fear, nor need he be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed. The issue
is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief
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that his safety or that of others was in danger.
Statev. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986).
After stopping defendant for speeding and
drinking while driving, investigating officer

77-7-19

had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for
a weapon upon observing a bulge in defendant's
pocket. State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R.- "Furtive" movement or gesture as
justifyingpolice search, 45 A.L.R.3d 581.

77-7-17. Authority
weapons.

of peace officer to take possession

of

A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a frisk may take
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall
either return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-17, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor

or infraction

charge.

A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, any public official of
any county or municipality charged with the enforcement of the law, a
port-of-entry agent as defined in Section 27-12-2, and a volunteer authorized to
issue a citation under Section 41-la-414 may issue and deliver a citation
requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or
infraction charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before whom the
person should be taken pursuant to law if the person had been arrested.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-18, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1990 ch. 39, § 4; 1994, ch. 7,
§ 9; 1994, ch. 104, § 5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment by ch. 7, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "a port-of-entry agent as defined in Section 27-12-2" for "personnel employed at an
inspection and checking station or port-of-entry
under Section 27-12-19."

The 1994 amendment by ch. 104, effective
May 2, 1994, inserted "and a volunteer authorized to issue a citation under Section 41-la414," making a related change.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Cross-References. - Wildlife Resources
Code violations, citation for, § 23-20-16.

77-7-19. Appearance required by citation - Arrest for
failure to appear - Transfer of cases - Motor
vehicle violations - Disposition
of fines and
costs.
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall appear before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before the time and date specified in the
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adopted by the Judicial Council or
Subsection 77-7-21( 1) permits forfeiture of bail for the offense charged.
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear sooner than five days or
later than 14 days following its issuance.
(3) A person who receives a citation and who fails to comply with Section
77-7-21 on or before the time and date and at the court specified is subject to
arrest. The magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest.
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( 4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a citation or information issued
for violations of Title 41 shall state that the persbti receiving the citation or
information shall appear before the magistrate who has jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of either the defense
attorney or prosecuting attorney, based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or
the disqualification of the judge, transfer cases to the nearest justice court or
the nearest circuit court within the county.
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative persortnel serving the district,
circuit, juvenile, and justice courts shall ensure that all citations for
violation of Title 41 are filed in a court with jurisdiction and venue and
shall refuse to receive citations that should be filed in another court.
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures imposed or collected for violations
of Title 41, which are filed contrary to this section shall be paid to the
entitled municipality or county by the state, county, or municipal treasurer who has received the fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the court
which collected them.
(c) The accounting and remitting of sums due shall be at the close of the
fiscal year of the municipality or county which has received fines, fees,
costs, or forfeitures as a result of any improperly filed citations.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-19, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§ 2;1986,ch.112,§ 3;1988,ch.
1,§ 398;1989,ch.157,§ 6;1990,ch.175,§ 3;
1990,ch.183,§ 50;1991,ch.268,§
17.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 ameµdment, effective January 1, 1992, added the
clause beginning "unless" in Subsection (1),
substituted ''who fails to comply with Section
77-7-21" for "fails to appear" in the first sentence in Subsection (3), redesignated former
Subsection (4)(a) as Subsection (4) and deleted
former Subsections (4)(b) and (4)(c), relating to
justice court jurisdiction over offenses committed within the geographical boundaries of any
municipality or county precinct and filing and

77-7-20.

trial of driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs and reckless driving offenses in the circuit court in the county where the offense
occurred, inserted "territorial" and deleted "except those cases filed under municipal ordinances" following "county'' in Subsection' (5),
and substituted "a court with jurisdiction and
venue" for "accordance with this section" in
Subsection (6)(a).
Cross-References. - Department of Public
Safety, Title 41, Chapter 13.
Office of Recovery Services, § 62A-ll-101 et
seq.
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail Schedule,
Code of Judicial Administration, Appendix C.

Service of citation on defendant
court - Contents of citations.

-

Filing in

(1) If a citation is issued pursuant to Section 77-7-18, the peace officer or
public official shall issue one copy to the person cited and shall within five days
file a duplicate copy with the court specified in the citation.
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under authority of this chapter shall
contain:
(a) the name of the court before which the person is to appear;
(b) the name of the person cited;
(c) a brief description of the offense charged;
(d) the date, time and place at which the offense is alleged to have
occurred;
(e) the date on which the citation was issued;
(f) the name of the peace officer or public official who issued the citation,
and the name of the arresting person if an arrest was made by a private
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party and the citation was issued in lieu of talring the arrested person
before a magistrate;
(g) the time and date on or before and after which the person is to
appear;
(h) the address of the court in which the person is to appear;
(i) a certification above the signature of the officer issuing the citation in
substantially the following language: "I certify that a copy of this citation
or information (Summons and Complaint) was duly served upon the
defendant according to law on the above date and I know or believe and so
allege that the above-named defendant did commit the offense herein set
forth contrary to law. I further certify that the court to which the
defendant has been directed to appear is the proper court pursuant to
Section 77-7-21."; and
(j) a notice containing substantially the following language:
READ CAREFULLY
This citation is not an information and will not be used as an information without your consent. If an information is filed you will be provided a
copy by the court. You MUST appear in court on or before the time set in
this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE
FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-20, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-7-21.

Proceeding on citation - Voluntary forfeiture of
bail - Parent signature requiredInformation,
when required.

(1) (a) A copy of the citation issued under Section 77-7-18 that is filed with
the magistrate may be used in lieu of an information to which the person
cited may plead guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail may
be forfeited.
(b) With the magistrate's approval, a person may voluntarily forfeit bail
without appearance being required in any case of a class B misdemeanor
or less.
(c) Voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be entered as a conviction and
treated the same as if the accused pleaded guilty.
(d) If the person cited is under 18 years of age, and if any of the charges
allege a violation of Title 41, the court shall promptly mail a copy -0f the
citation or a notice of the citation to the address as shown on the citation,
to the attention of the parent or guardian of the defendant.
(2) An information shall be filed and proceedings held in accordance with
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provisions of this code
if the person cited:
(a) willfully fails to appear before a magistrate pursuant to a citation
issued under Section 77-7-18;
(b) pleads not guilty to the offense charged; or
(c) does not deposit bail on or before the date set for the person's
appearance.
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(3) (a) The information is an original pleading.

(b) If a person cited waives by written agreement the filing of the
information, the prosecution may proceed on the citation.

History: C. 1953, 77-7-21, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1994, ch. 100, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

77-7-22.

ment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsection
(l)(d) and made numerous stylistic changes.

Failure to appear as misdemeanor.

Any person who willfully fails to appear before a court pursuant to a citation
issued under the provisions of Section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, regardless of the disposition of the charge upon which he was
originally cited.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-22, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-7-23.

Delivery of prisoner arrested without warrant to
magistrate - Transfer to court with jurisdiction
- Violation as misdemeanor.

(1) (a) When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or
private person, the person arrested shall be taken without unnecessary
delay to the magistrate in the circuit court, the precinct of the county, or
the municipality in which the offense occurred, except under Subsection
(2). An information stating the charge against the person shall be made
before the magistrate.
(b) If the justice court judge of the precinct or municipality or the circuit
judge is not available, the arrested person shall be taken before the
magistrate within the same county who is nearest to the scene of the
alleged offense or nearest to the jail under Subsection (2), who may act as
committing magistrate for arraigning the accused, setting bail, or issuing
warrants.
(2) If the arrested person under Subsection (1) must be transported from jail
to a magistrate, the person may be taken before the magistrate nearest to the
jail rather than the magistrate specified in Subsection (1) for arraignment,
setting bail, or issuing warrants.
(3) The case shall then be transferred to the court having jurisdiction. This
section does not confer jurisdiction upon a court unless otherwise provided by
law.
(4) Any officer or person violating this section is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-23, enacted by L.
1980,ch.15,§ 2;1989,ch.157,§
7;1990,ch.
47, § 1.
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CHAPTERS
LINEUPS
Section
77-8-1.
77-8-2.

Section
77-8-3.
77-8-4.

Order of magistrate - Grounds Arrested suspect's appearance
without order.
Suspect's right to have attorney
present.

77-8-1.

Conduct of peace officer.
Record of proceedings - Access by
suspect.

Order of magistrate - Grounds -Arrested
pect's appearance without order.

sus-

(1) A magistrate may issue an order requiring a suspect to appear in a
lineup when probable cause exists to believe a crime has been committed and
there is reason to believe the suspect committed it.
(2) A suspect who has been arrested, and is in custody, may be required by
a peace officer to appear in a lineup without a court order.
(3) Upon application of any suspect and a showing of good cause, a
magistrate may order a lineup.
History: C. 1953, 77-8-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Showup.
Where assault victim identified defendant by
name prior to police officer bringing defendant
and his brothers to crime scene to be viewed by
victim for purpose of confirming which of brothers victim was accusing of crime, identification
procedure was not a "lineup" as contemplated
by this section, but was more properly classified

as a "showup," and given fact that victim was
badly beaten and thought to be near death by
police officer and that defendant and his brothers were transients, exigent circumstances existed justifying identification procedure, and
evidence of showup identification was admissible. State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -21Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 716,952.
A.L.R. - Requiring suspect or defendant in
criminal case to demonstrate voice for purposes
of identification, 24 A.L.R.3d 1261.
Admissibility of evidence of lineup identification as affected by allegedly suggestive lineup
procedures, 39 A.L.R.3d 487.
Admissibility of evidence of showup identifi-

77-8-2.

cation as affected by allegedly suggestive
showup procedures, 39 A.L.R.3d 791.
Admissibility of photographic identification
as affected by allegedly suggestive identification procedure, 39 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63
A.L.R.4th 143.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e:o 419,
566.

Suspect's right to have attorney present.

A suspect has the right to have his attorney present at any lineup. The
magistrate or party in charge of the lineup shall notify the suspect of this right.
Every suspect unable to employ counsel shall be entitled to representation by
an attorney appointed by a magistrate for a lineup either before or after an
arrest.
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History: C. 1953, 77-8-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
.ANALYSIS

Identification at scene of crime.
Showup.
Identification at scene of crime.
Right to have attorney present applied to
lineups; it did not require the presence of an
attorney for an accused who was presented to
the victim for identification less than one block
from the scene of the crime, and within ten to
fifteen minutes of its commission. State v.
Allen, 29 Utah 2d 442, 511 P.2d 159 (1973).

77-8-3.

Showup .
Where police had not yet focused an investigation on defendant alone when they conducted
an identification procedure, and where they
knew whicr. three men had been involved in the
fight and conducted the procedure to determine
which one actually stabbed the victim, the
procedure was a showup, and accordingly, defendant did not have the right to have counsel
present. State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).

Conduct of peace officer.

The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not attempt to influence the
identification of any particular suspect.
History: C. 1953, 77-8-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-8-4.

Record of proceedings

- Access by suspect.

The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations
between the witnesses and the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall
have access to and may make copies of the record and any photographs taken
of him or any other persons in connection with the lineup.
History: C. 1953, 77-8-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

CHAPTER Sa
CRIMINAL OFFENSE CHARGES
Section
77-8a-1.

77-8a-1.

Joinder of offenses and of defendants.

Joinder of offenses and of defendants.

(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the
offenses charged are:
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in
their commission; or
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.
(2) (a) When a felony and misdemeanor are charged together the defendant
is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to both the misdemeanor
and felony offenses.
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(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or
conduct or in the same criminal episode.
(c) The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or
separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
(d) When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense,
they shall be tried jointly urtless the court in its discretion on motion or
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(3) (a) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both
to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more
than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information.
(b) The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under a
single indictment or information.
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief
as justice requires.
(b) A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived
if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling on a
motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to
disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to
introduce in evidence at the trial.
History: C. 1953, 77-Sa-1, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 201, § 1.
Compiler's Notes. - This section is a recodificationof former Rule 9 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Notes to cases constru-

ing that rule are included in the notes to this
section.
Cross-References. - Limited admissibility
of evidence, Rule 105, U.R.E.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
targeted gay men, offered them a ride on his
motorcycle, drove them to a canyon, robbed
them at knife point, forced them to undress,
scattered their clothes, and left them alone in
the canyon, there was sufficient basis for the
trial court to conclude that the crimes were
"alleged to have been part of a common scheme
or plan" under this section. State v. Lee, 831
P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

ANALYSIS

Commonscheme or plan.
Denial of severance.
-Standard of review.
Discretion of trial court.
Failure to request severance.
Joinder or severance of defendants.
-Antagonistic defenses.
-Cautionary instructions.
-Specific cases.
-Waiver of objections.
Joinder or severance of offenses.
-In general.
-Specific cases.
- Waiver of objections.
Motions to sever.
-Timeliness.
Prejudicial joinder.
Cited.

Denial of severance.
-Standard of review.
A denial of severance will be reversed by the
appellate court only if it is affirmatively shown
that a defendant's right to a fair trial has been
impaired. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440 (Utah
1986).

Common scheme or plan.
In a case charging aggravated robberies
based on two separate incidents with parallel
fact patterns, i.e., defendant went to gay bars,

Discretion of trial court.
In absence of showing that trial court abused
its discretion, appellate court will not interfere
with action of the trial court in denying separate trials to two defendants charged with
gambling violation. State v. Burke, 102 Utah
249, 129 P.2d 560 (1942).
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Where accused cannot demand a severance
as a matter of right, it must appear that the
trial court had before it facts indicating that
accused would be unduly prejudiced by a joint
trial before the Supreme Court will hold that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the motion. State v. Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177
P.2d 727 (Utah 1947).
The grant or denial of severance is a matter
within the discretion of the trial judge. State v.
Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194
(1978); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
Because of the discretion vested in the trial
court, considerable latitude should be given to
its decision, and a conviction will be reversed
for refusing a motion for severance only if
refusal is a clear abuse of discretion in that it
sacrifices the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338
(Utah 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.
Ct. 219, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978).
When defendants are charged jointly, trial
court must weigh possible prejudice to any
defendant against considerations of economy
and practicalities of judicial administration;
doubts concerning prejudice should be resolved
in favor of a defendant, but the trial court must
be afforded some discretion in denying a motion
for severance; and a denial will be reversed only
if a defendant's right to a fair trial has been
impaired. State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah
1980).
Severance of various counts contained in one
information rests within the discretion of the
trial court, in the interests of the preservation
of justice. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353
(Utah 1980).
A ruling on a motion to sever charges under
this rule is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal,
absent an abuse of discretion. State v.
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); State v.
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988).
Severance is not available as a matter of
right. Whether severance is granted depends
upon whether the trial court determines that
prejudice to the defendant outweighs considerations of economy and practicalities of judicial
administration, with doubts being resolved in
favor of severance. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d
440 (Utah 1986).
Whether joinder would prejudice either party
enough to warrant severance is within the
court's sound discretion. State v. Haga, 735 P.2d
44 (Utah 1987).

Failure to request severance.
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure
to seek a severance, the defendant must demonstrate both that the motion should have been

granted and "a reasonable probability'' that,
but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Hallett, 796 P.2d 701 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), aff'd, 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).

Joinder or severance of defendants.
-Antagonistic
defenses.
Although one defendant alleged that his defense required him to argue that certain parts
of a witness' testimony were true while his
codefendant maintained they were false, the
trial court did not err in allowing joinder of the
defendants. State v. Dumas, 554 P.2d 1313
(Utah 1976).
Antagonistic defenses alone are not sufficient
to require a separate trial; the test of whether
antagonistic defenses by two defendants require severance is whether the conflict in the
codefendants' respective positions at trial is of
such a nature that, considering all the evidence
in the case, the defendants would be denied a
fair trial by a joint trial. State v. O'Brien, 721
P.2d 896 (Utah 1986).
Antagonistic defenses alone are not sufficient
to require a separate trial; the test of whether
antagonistic defenses by two defendants require severance is whether the defenses conflict
to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440
(Utah 1986); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
-Cautionary instructions.
Court did not err in failing to give cautionary
instructions to effect that evidence that was
admitted against one defendant might not be
competent against codefendant, since such evidence was actually nonprejudicial and no request for cautionary instructions was made by
counsel. State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158
P.2d 127, 159 A.L.R. 340 (Utah 1945).
Where a proper motion has been made at a
proper time, a failure to grant a severance on
the grounds of confession of a codefendant is
not prejudicial if the court properly instructs
the jury as to the use of the confession. State v.
Miller, 111 Utah 255, 177 P.2d 727 (Utah 1947).
-Specific cases.
In a prosecution for murder, where it was
shown that the defendants participated in a
joint activity, that the defenses of the joint
defendants, while different, were not inconsistent or antagonistic, that counsel cooperated
with each other throughout the trial and where
the trial court was careful to admonish and
instruct the jury that certain evidence was
admissible as to one defendant and not the
other, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying separate trials. State v. Rivenburgh,
11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 922, 82 S. Ct. 246, 7 L. Ed. 2d
137, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 144, 82 S. Ct.
247, 7 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1961).
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Trial court's refusal to grant separate trials
to codefendants charged with third degree burglary was not improper since such separation
was discretionary with trial court and no abuse
of discretion was shown. State v. Faulkner, 23
Utah 2d 257, 461 P.2d 470 (Utah 1969).
There was no abuse of discretion in the
denial of defendant's motion for separate trials,
since the ground for the motion was the possible introduction of certain statements which
the prosecution agreed would not be offered in
evidence. State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658 (Utah
1974).
In the first-degree murder prosecution of two
defendants, after witness who had given testimony exculpatory to one defendant and incriminatory to the second was discredited by counsel for the second defendant, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse
to grant a mistrial as to the first defendant
since, considered in the context of the other
evidence, the adverse effect of the discrediting
evidence was negligible. State v. Gaxiola, 550
P.2d 1298 (Utah 1976).
Where first count in information in kidnapping-rape prosecution was amended to indicate
acts of defendant in detaining victim commenced on November 20 and continued to the
24th, the second count already alleging codefendant raped victim on or about the 21st, there
was no improper joinder of the two defendants
since the amended information alleged both
defendants engaged in criminal acts against
the victim at the same place during the same
time period; it would have been better practice
to have included such allegations initially in
the information since to do otherwise could
induce error. State v. Hayes, 572 P.2d 368 (Utah
1977).
Defendant charged with kidnapping was not
entitled to a separate trial as a matter of right
on theory he would be prejudiced by being tried
jointly with one charged with a sexual offense
(rape). State v. Hayes, 572 P.2d 368 (Utah
1977).

Joinder of defendants in information and
joint trial did not unduly prejudice particular
defendant where criminal acts charged took
place in same automobile and during same time
period, substantial part of evidence and testimony offered by state was relevant to charges
against each of the defendants, and none of the
defenses of either accused was antagonistic to
the interests of any codefendant. State v.
Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980).
Severance was not required where both defendants admitted that the acts charged took
place, the defense of the first defendant was
that he had diminished capacity as a result of
alcoholism, and the defense of the second defendant was that the first defendant exerted
coercive influence on him. State v. O'Brien, 721
P.2d 896 (Utah 1986).

77-Sa-1

Trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to sever the trial when defendant could
not show that codefendant would testify in a
severed trial and that any testimony given
would be relevant and favorable. State v.
Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

-Waiver of objections.
Because no pretrial motion for severance of
defendants was made, defendants waived the
issue of misjoinder of defendants at trial. State
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1985), overruled
in part on other grounds, State v. Ossana, 739
P.2d 628 (Utah 1987).
Joinder or severance of offenses.
-In general.
If a defendant is charged with multiple
crimes, for one of which evidence of prior convictions is relevant, it is error for a court not to
sever that crime from those for which prior
conviction is not relevant. State v. Saunders,
699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985).
-Specific cases.
Under former section, charges of rape and
adultery could not be joined in information.
State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 280
(1926).
Where perjury indictment specified four
"counts" which so far as the indictment showed
were in reality four separate offenses, there
was a misjoinder of offenses charged by the
indictment. Cassidy v. Second Judicial Dist.
Court, 109 Utah 519, 167 P.2d 970 (Utah 1946).
Separate counts charging burglary and larceny could properly be set out in one information. Wilkinson v. Harris, 109 Utah 76, 163 P.2d
1023 (Utah 1945); Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah
330, 178 P.2d 397 (1947).
Separate and different charges of rape of
defendant's two stepdaughters (relating to incidents several months apart and with different
victims) and of sodomy involving defendant's
stepson (a separate and distinct offense with
different elements) were not of such similarity
in character and circumstances of commission
that, considering fairness to defendant, they
should have been joined; thus, though evidence
appeared sufficient to sustain, the convictions
would be reversed because of misjoinder of the
three charges. State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1979).
Defendant had a due process right to severance of the counts in an information and separate trial thereon where four of the five counts
in the information did not form part of the same
criminal transaction, the counts were not so
identical as to evince a common design or
scheme, and the evidence relating to the various counts was not mutually admissible. State
v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion or
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deny defendant his right to due process by
refusing to sever counts for possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person and
aggravated assault. State v. Studham, 655 P.2d
669 (Utah 1982).
Failure to sever charges of possession of a
firearm by a restricted person from burglary
and theft charges was an abuse of discretion,
where although evidence that defendant was a
prison inmate at the time of the offenses was
relevant to prove a fact other than criminal
disposition material to the offense of possession
of a firearm by a restricted person, the effect of
the joinder was to permit the jury to consider
evidence of defendant's prior crime as the basis
for an inference that he committed the burglary
and theft. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738
(Utah 1985).
Offenses of murder and child abuse could
properly be joined, when defendant's purpose in
attempting to strangle a child was to keep the
child from telling others that he had killed the
child's mother; the two events were closely
related in time and incident to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective, so as to be
part ofa single criminal episode. State v. Lopez,
789 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Where the offenses of robbery, murder, and
forgery occurred within a matter of hours, involved the same victim, and were part of an
effort to acquire property of the victim, joinder
of the forgery charge with murder and robbery
charges was not an abuse of discretion. State v.
Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993).

- Waiver of objections.
Objection that information alleged two offenses could not be raised for first time on
appeal. State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d
640, 93 AL.R. 723 (Utah 1934).
A defendant who makes no objection to the
information and no request for severance of
charges waives the right to raise the issue of
misjoinder of offenses on appeal. State v.

Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1985), overruled in
part on other grounds, State v. Ossana, 739
P.2d 628 (Utah 1987).

Motions to sever.
-Timeliness.
Defendant's motion to sever count charging
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, § 76-10-503, from a count
charging aggravated assault, § 76-5-103, was
untimely when made only moments before the
trial; thus, trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion where
joinder of the counts did not violate defendant's
due process rights. State v. Studham, 655 P.2d
669 (Utah 1982).
Even though there is a time limit for asserting, in writing, the right to sever trials, the
time limit cannot be used to defeat a person's
constitutional rights if the basic essentials of
due process clearly are lacking in not severing
the counts. State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669
(Utah 1982).
Prejudicial joinder.
The threshold inquiry as to whether joinder
is prejudicial to a defendant is whether evidence of the other crime would have been
admissible in a separate trial. State v. Lee, 831
P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In a case charging aggravated robberies
based on two separate incidents with parallel
fact patterns, evidence of one robbery would
have been admissible at a separate trial to
establish intent and the probative value of the
evidence would outweigh any prejudicial effort;
severance of the charges would have served no
purpose and defendant was not prejudiced by
the trial court's refusal to sever the counts.
State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Cited in State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50
(Utah 1993).
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Am. Jur. 2d. - 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments
and Informations §§ 209 to 225.
C.J.S. - 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations§ 142 et seq.

A.L.R. - Antagonistic defenses as ground
for separate trials of codefendants in criminal
case, 82 A.L.R.3d 245.
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UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT
Section
77-9-1.
77-9-2.
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Section
77-9-3.
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Authority of peace officer of this state
beyond normal jurisdiction.

77-9-3

UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT

77-9-1. Authority of peace officer of another state.
A peace officer of another state or the District of Columbia who enters this
state in fresh pursuit and continues in fresh pursuit of a person in order to
arrest him on the ground that he is reasonably believed to have committed a
felony in another state, has the same authority to arrest and hold a person in
custody as a peace officer of this state. Fresh pursuit does not require instant
action, but pursuit without unreasonable delay.
History: C. 1953, 77-9-1, enacted
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

by L.

Cross-References. ally, § 77-30-1 et seq.

Extradition

gener-

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 51.
C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S. Arrest §§ 18, 53.

Key Numbers. - Arrest

®:a>63.3,

66.

77-9-2. Procedure after arrest.
An officer who has made an arrest pursuant to Section 77-9-1 shall without
unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the county
in which the arrest was made. The magistrate shall conduct a hearing to
determine the lawfulness of the arrest. If he finds the arrest was lawful, the
magistrate may commit the person arrested for a reasonable time or may
admit the person to bail pending extradition proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 77-9-2, enacted
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

by L

77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state beyond
normal jurisdiction.
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any governmental entity of this
state may exercise a peace officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's
normal jurisdiction as follows:
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for the purpose of arresting and
holding that person in custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction
where the offense was committed;
(b) When a public offense is committed in such officer's presence;
(c) When participating in an investigation of criminal activity which
originated in such officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the
local authority;
(d) When called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction.
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such authorized action, shall notify and
receive approval of the local law enforcement authority, or if such prior contact
is not reasonably possible, notify the local law enforcement authority as soon
as reasonably possible. Unless specifically requested to aid a police officer of
another jurisdiction or otherwise as provided for by law, no legal responsibility
for a police officer's action outside his normal jurisdiction and as provided
herein, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority.
History: C. 1953, 77-9-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Undercover investigation.
Subsection 77-la-1(2) and this section do not
merely apply to the officially exercised acts of a
uniformed police officer, but are meant to encompass the total spectrum of an officer's acts
and authority, including an authorized undercover investigation of a drug offense. When an

officer does not comply with these statutory
requirements, however, the information need
not be dismissed nor the evidence obtained as a
result of the illegal investigation be suppressed. State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah
1987).

CHAPTER IO
FORMATION OF THE GRAND JURY
(Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 318, § 23.)

77-10-1 to 77-10-8.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Laws 1990, ch. 318, § 23 repeals
§§ 77-10-1 to 77-10-8, as enacted by L. 1980,

ch. 15, § 2, relating to the formation of grand

juries, effective July 1, 1990. For present provisions, see Chapter 10a of this title.

CHAPTER 10a
GRAND JURY REFORM
Section
77-l0a-1.
77-l0a-2.
77-lOa-3.
77-l0a-4.
77-lOa-5.
77-lOa-6.
77-lOa-7.
77-lOa-8.

77-lOa-9.
77-l0a-10.
77-lOa-ll.
77-l0a-12.

Definitions.
Panel of judges - Appointment
- Membership - Ordering of
grand jury.
Scope of grand jury inquiry.
Number of members - Number
required for indictment.
Grand jurors - Qualification
and selection - Limits on disclosure.
Repealed.
Selection of grand jurors - Notice - Examination - Qualification - Alternates.
Challenge of prospective grand
jurors - Failure to comply in
selection of jurors - Remedies.
Oath for grand jurors.
Charge of grand jury - Rights
and duties.
Jury foreman - Compensation
of grand jurors.
Representation of state - Appointment and compensation
of special prosecutor.

Section
77-lOa-13.

77-lOa-14.
77-lOa-15.
77-l0a-16.
77-l0a-17.
77-l0a-18.
77-l0a-19.
77-l0a-20.
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Location - Who may be present
- Witnesses - Witnesses
who are subjects - Evidence
- Contempt - Notice Record of proceedings - Disclosure.
Concurrence for indictment Proof - Validity - Disclosure.
Return and transfer of indictment.
Return of indictment - Warrant of arrest - Bail.
Grand jury report on noncriminal conduct - Action on the
report.
Grand jury term of service Excusing a juror.
Compensation for special prosecutors.
Expenses of grand jury - Appropriation - Payment by
state or county.

